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V.—*On the Development of the Latin Subjunctive in Principal Clauses.*

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It is the object of this paper to give a brief outline of the probable development of the Latin Subjunctive in Principal Clauses. It aims to trace the steps by which the various meanings of this mood, as seen in Latin authors, have been gradually developed out of the simple etymological force of its original forms.

The Latin Subjunctive contains the forms of two moods, originally distinct, though closely related,—the subjunctive proper with the sign *a*, and the optative with the sign *i*. These forms, however, are used without any difference of meaning, and are made to supplement each other. Thus the subjunctive forms are found in the present tense of the second, of the third, and of the fourth conjugation, as *moneas*, *moneatis*, *regam*, *regamus*, *audiat*, *audiant*, while the optative forms are used in all the other tenses of these conjugations, and in all the tenses of the first, as *monerem*, *rexerim*, *audissem*, *amem*, *amarem*, etc.

Moreover the Latin Subjunctive contains the meanings, as well as the forms, of two distinct moods—the subjunctive and optative, of the cognate tongues, and what is especially noteworthy in this connection is that while in Sanskrit and Greek the subjunctive and optative meanings are denoted by separate forms, in Latin they are both expressed by the same form.

Again in Latin the subjunctive and optative forms are not by any means confined to the significations ordinarily ascribed to those moods in the cognate tongues, but have a much wider range of application. Thus :

1. They supply the place of the future indicative in all verbs of the third and of the fourth conjugation. Thus the subjunctive form *regam*, ‘let me rule,’ also supplies the future

‘I shall or will rule;’ *audiam*, ‘let me hear,’ is also future, ‘I shall or will hear.’ But in the other persons, the optative forms supply the future. Thus *reges, reget*, etc., though optatives in origin and form, are never used in an optative or a subjunctive sense, but only with the force of the future indicative, not ‘may you rule,’ ‘let him rule,’ etc., but, ‘you shall or will rule,’ etc.

2. The forms of the Latin Subjunctive not only thus supply the future indicative, but they are also used with their own proper force in various subordinate clauses which originally must have taken the indicative. They thus occur in causal and temporal clauses, in dependent questions, and in the subordinate clauses of the *oratio obliqua*.

Such are some of the peculiarities of the form and use of the Latin Subjunctive, peculiarities whose complete explanation can be found only in the general development of the mood itself. Special discussions of separate points are of course indispensable, but they often rest upon too narrow a basis to give the best results. Such discussions of special usages in the Latin Subjunctive have often been for this very reason but partially successful. Constructions, closely connected both with each other and with the general subject, have been taken out of their proper connections, as parts of one complete whole. But any trustworthy discussion of the Latin Subjunctive, or of any vital points connected with it, must rest upon a much broader basis. It must gather light, not only from the whole range of the Latin language, but even from the cognate tongues. Such a discussion will accordingly involve:

1. The general development of the subjunctive and optative moods, as shown by constructions common to the Sanskrit, the Greek, and the Latin.

2. The later special development of the mood on Latin soil.

What then, we inquire, was the origin of the two classes of forms appropriated to the subjunctive and optative moods, and what was their original force?

It is well known that the Indo-European language developed various methods of forming the present stem from the root.

The stem thus formed differed in meaning from the root simply in the fact that it denoted continued action, while the root expressed only the general idea of the action itself, without any reference to its continuance. Of the various forms of the present stem originally used, three became especially important in the subsequent development of verbal inflections. These were :

1. The reduplicated present stem, from which was developed the Indo-European perfect. For a discussion of this subject, it is only necessary to refer to an able paper read before this Association four years ago by Professor Alonzo Williams.

2. The present stem in *a*, from which was developed the Indo-European subjunctive.

3. The present stem in *ja = i*, 'to go,' as seen in *εἶμι*, *eo*. From this were developed the optative mood and the future indicative.

Thus both the subjunctive and the optative mood are in their origin only special developments of certain forms of the present tense, a view now generally accepted, I think, by the leading scholars of the new school. Let us now briefly illustrate this point in its relation to each of these moods. We shall thus find, I trust, that these etymological forms throw light upon the subsequent development of the Latin Subjunctive.

It will be remembered that in the mother-tongue of the Indo-European family, from which the Latin, the Greek, and the Sanskrit alike derived their various inflections, the original type of a verb consisted simply of the union of a verbal root with a pronominal root or stem. Thus from the root *da* was formed *da-ta*, Latin *dat*, 'he gives;' from root *bhar*, *bhar-ta*, Latin *fert*, 'he bears.' Subsequently these roots were developed into stems in various ways, especially by the addition of the determinative *a*. These stems were then inflected by the addition of pronominal roots or stems. Thus from the root *bhar* was formed the stem *bhara*, from which comes the verb *bhara-ta*. The language then contained two sets of forms, one denoting simply the action of the verb, the other that

action in its continuance, progress, as *bhar-ta*, 'he bears,' *bhara-ta*, 'he is bearing,' 'is trying to bear,' or 'is one who bears.' This latter form, denoting as it does continued or prolonged action, is especially fitted to emphasize the idea of effort. Indeed the conative use of the present indicative is distinctly recognized in all ages of the Latin literature. But earnest effort readily suggests *desire*, as one strives only for that which one desires to attain. Hence *bhara-ma*, 'I am bearing,' or 'trying to bear,' comes also to mean 'I desire, intend, purpose, to bear.' But vigorous effort suggests not only *desire*, but also *possibility* or *probability*, as one will very likely accomplish that which one is already attempting. Here then we have, as I conceive, the original form and meaning of the Indo-European subjunctive, a special form of the present indicative used in a somewhat special sense to denote, first, an *attempted* action, and secondly, a *desired*, *possible*, or *probable* action. The development of the mood was doubtless exceedingly slow and gradual. At first the difference in meaning between this particular form and the other forms of the present tense was scarcely perceptible, but it gradually became more and more marked until at length a new mood was recognized. Then for the first time in the history of the Indo-European language did the subjunctive mood have a recognized existence, as distinct from the indicative.

But the Latin Subjunctive, as we have already noticed, also contains the Indo-European optative, a mood developed from that form of the present stem whose formative element is the verb *ja*, or *i*, 'to go.' The stem in *ja*, which, like all forms of present stems, denoted originally *duration*, *continued action*, became the basis of several important verbal inflections, of which we notice the following :

1. The present indicative, as ἀγγέλλω = ἀγγέλ-*ja*, 'I go as a messenger, am a messenger, I announce.'

2. The future indicative, as erit = *es-it* for *es-i-ti*, 'he is going to be;' δῶσω = ἰῶσ-*ja*, 'I am going to give.'

3. The optative, as sit = *esit* = *es-ie-ti*, identical with the original form of the future, and like that meaning originally 'he is going to be;' δοίης = δο-ίη-*σι*, 'you are going to give.'

Now these etymological facts are instructive in various ways. They show

1. That the Indo-European optative was identical in origin both with the future indicative and with one form of the present.

2. That it was used originally to denote a *contemplated*, *future*, or *probable* action, as $\delta\omicron\iota\nu$, '*I am going to give*,' almost synonymous with $\delta\acute{\omega}\sigma\omega$, '*I shall give*.' Here we recognize at the very outset in the development of the mood one of the familiar uses of the Greek optative, viz., its potential use with $\alpha\upsilon$, often best rendered into English by the future indicative with which it was identical in origin.

But this etymological meaning of the optative naturally suggests *desire*, *wish*, as $\delta\omicron\iota\nu$, *I am going to give*, *intend to give*, readily suggests the kindred thought, *I would like to give*, *may I give*.

We have thus reached for the Indo-European optative two distinct but closely related meanings, which may be regarded as primitive and etymological,—meanings, moreover, which accord very exactly with those previously found for the subjunctive.

From the facts now presented it seems clear that originally the subjunctive and the optative were closely related, both in form and meaning, not only with certain parts of the indicative, but also with each other.

But we have already noticed the fact that the Latin Subjunctive contains the general meanings of the subjunctive and the optative of the cognate tongues, and that these meanings are denoted sometimes by subjunctive forms, and sometimes by optative forms, i. e., indiscriminately by either. We have also observed that these same forms in a large class of verbs regularly supply the place of the future indicative.

What now is the explanation of this remarkable confusion in the use of forms, a confusion so great that different forms, subjunctive and optative, occur with precisely the same meaning, and the same forms with different meanings? Did the Latin lose important distinctions which it had inherited from the Indo-European, or were these kindred forms which we

have been considering so closely related in meaning when that language first began to have a separate existence, that they might be used with comparatively little difference of meaning? That the Latin may have lost some distinctions that it once had, is not at all improbable, but that it ever possessed the nice and delicate distinctions seen in the Greek subjunctive and optative is in the highest degree improbable. Indeed these distinctions are, I think, now regarded by those whose opinions are entitled to the greatest weight as the special product of the Greek mind. Accordingly, in my judgment, the indiscriminate use in Latin of subjunctive and optative forms in connection with the regular use of those same forms to supply the place of the future indicative in many verbs, contains an important historical fact in the development of these moods. It shows that, when the Latin first became a separate language, the forms of the subjunctive, of the optative, and of the future indicative were used with little or no difference of meaning, a view fully confirmed, as we have just seen, by the etymology of the forms themselves.

Having thus examined the etymological meaning of the Latin Subjunctive forms, we proceed, in the second place, to inquire what relation this meaning sustains to that which is actually found in the works of Latin authors. In conducting this inquiry we shall find it necessary to study the Latin Subjunctive, first in simple sentences and principal clauses, and secondly in subordinate clauses.

What then appears to be the primitive or fundamental meaning of the Latin Subjunctive as seen in Principal Clauses? That the primitive features of the mood were first developed in principal rather than in subordinate clauses scarcely admits of a doubt. The old theory which made all subjunctive clauses subordinate by supplying supposed ellipses, is so completely exploded as scarcely to require a passing remark, yet traces of its influence may be discovered, even in valuable works of recent date. The most trustworthy scholars, however, are all agreed in the opinion that the subjunctive and optative moods, in all their general and characteristic features, as seen in the Sanskrit, the Greek, and the Latin, were developed in principal clauses.

But what has already been said in regard to the etymological meaning of the subjunctive forms renders it clear that we must not expect to find, as the result of this inquiry, any broad and well defined line of distinction between the provinces originally occupied respectively by the indicative and the subjunctive. Accordingly, when we turn to the Vedas, which furnish us our earliest specimens of Sanskrit, and to the poems of Homer, which furnish us our earliest examples of Greek syntax, we often meet the subjunctive in uses much more closely related to that of the future indicative than in later works. Indeed, in such examples as the Homeric

οὐ γάρ πω τοίους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι, Iliad 1, 262,

'for I have never seen, and I do not expect to see such heroes,' the substitution of the future indicative for the subjunctive would scarcely make a perceptible change in the thought. It is also well known that in the Homeric poems the aorist subjunctive and the future indicative are often identical in form, and that the difference in meaning between them is sometimes so very slight that it is not possible even to distinguish the one from the other. We have already noticed the familiar fact that the optative with *ἄν* is often used in a future sense. But the Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit, in the use of moods, conform to the same general analogy. Indeed the use of subjunctive and optative forms in Latin to supply the place of the future indicative does not differ at all in kind from the Homeric use of similar forms in a future sense; it is in fact simply the result of carrying out that analogy on a larger scale. In view of these facts the conclusion seems inevitable

1. That when the Sanskrit, the Greek, and the Latin first became separate languages, the distinction between the indicative, on the one hand, and the subjunctive and optative on the other, so clearly recognized in the classical period, was only partially developed.

2. That among the various meanings denoted by subjunctive and optative forms in the earliest writers, those which are most closely related to the general meaning of the indicative may safely be regarded as the earliest. We recognize, therefore, in the signification just noticed, as belonging to the early

Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, one of the most primitive uses of these moods, the potential use denoting *expectation*, *likelihood*, *a contemplated action*.

But the Latin Subjunctive, like the Sanskrit and Greek subjunctive and optative, also denotes *desire*, *wish*. It is thus used :

1. In prayers and wishes: *Di bene vertant*, ‘may the gods cause it to turn out well,’ Plaut.

2. In exhortations and entreaties: *Consultamus bonis*, ‘let us consult for the good,’ Cic.

3. In commands, admonitions, warnings, and especially in negative commands, prohibitions: *Scribere ne pigrescere*, ‘do not neglect to write,’ Cic.

4. In admissions and concessions: *Fuerint pertinaces*, ‘grant or admit that they were obstinate,’ Cic.

This use of the subjunctive, like the potential, is readily developed out of the etymological signification of the subjunctive form, as we have already seen, since earnest effort naturally implies *desire*. Indeed, in the Vedas and in the Homeric poems we sometimes find the subjunctive of desire apparently in the very first stage of its development, scarcely distinguishable, on the one hand, from the future indicative, and on the other from the potential subjunctive, but perhaps differing from the latter very much as the two ordinary signs of the English future — *shall* and *will* — differ from each other. In the Homeric expression already quoted, οὐ γάρ πω ἴδον, οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι, the subjunctive involves no idea of desire; it is entirely *potential* in its nature, but is as yet so imperfectly developed as to be scarcely distinguishable from the future. It may even be rendered by the future *shall*, but not by *will*. In some passages, however, as

δεῦτε, δύο μοι ἑπεσθον, ἴδωμ’, ὅτιν’ ἔργα τέτυκται, Iliad 22, 450,

‘here, you two follow me, I wish to see what has happened,’ the subjunctive denotes *desire*, yet it is so closely related to the future that it may be rendered by our auxiliary *will*, *I will see*. Indeed, in some instances in Homer, it is very difficult to determine even from the context whether a given subjunctive

should be interpreted as *potential*, or as expressive of *desire*, or even to say why the subjunctive is used at all, as

ἀλλ' ἄγ', ἐγὼν αὐτὸς περὶ ἑσομαι ἢ δὲ ἴδωμαι, *Odys.* 6, 126,

'but come, I will myself try and see, or let me try and see;' or again,

ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον, ἀρήϊα τεύχεα δύνω, *Iliad* 6, 340,

'but come, now wait, let me put on my martial armor,' or 'I will put on,' etc. The subjunctive in such instances appears to be still in embryo.

We have now seen that these two uses of the Latin Subjunctive, and of the corresponding moods in the cognate tongues, the subjunctive and optative, appear in different stages of development in the very earliest literary records that have come down to us from any branch of the Indo-European family, and that they are readily and naturally derived from the etymological meaning of the forms themselves. Moreover it is well known that these two meanings, which for convenience we may call potential and optative, run through the whole range of Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin literature, and that in their several forms they embrace all the meanings known to the Latin Subjunctive in Principal Clauses.

If the doctrine of this paper is correct, it is quite clear that the view once so generally received that the potential subjunctive was first developed in conditional sentences is no longer tenable. We have already seen that the potential use of the subjunctive springs directly and naturally from the etymological force of the forms, and that it is also found fully developed in simple sentences in the earliest literary records extant. I may also add that there are strong reasons for believing that it was long used before conditional sentences were known.

But before we close this part of our discussion, I must anticipate an objection from those who adopt without qualification the views of Professor Delbrück, as set forth in his masterly treatise on the use of the subjunctive and optative in Sanskrit and Greek, a work, let me add, greatly superior, in my judgment, to all others upon the subject which it treats.

Delbrück, in his attempt to find the primitive meaning of these moods, assumes without authority, as it seems to me,

that it is to be sought only in the first person singular, thus excluding from his investigation all plural forms, and all forms in the second and third persons. He does so simply because, as he himself says, it is generally admitted that the primitive meaning of the optative is that of wishing, and that this meaning is expressed in its greatest purity in the first person singular. His own words are: "Es wird vermuthlich jetzt allgemein angenommen, dass die älteste Bedeutung des Optativs der Wunsch sei." But if the common opinion that the idea of wishing lies at the basis of the optative is correct, what occasion is there for a special investigation on the part of Professor Delbrück to ascertain the primitive use of that mood? On the other hand, if the correctness of such an opinion is questioned, what right has the Professor to limit his inquiry to the particular person and number in which that meaning appears, and to reject the other persons in which a different idea is prominent? How does he know in advance that the latter may not be as truly primitive as the former? This assumption, it seems to me, has led Professor Delbrück to overlook one important element in the primitive use of the subjunctive and optative. Assuming that the original force of each is seen in the first person singular, he reaches the conclusion that the subjunctive originally denoted *will*, *determination*; the optative *wish*, *desire*.

Now if we examine subjunctive and optative forms in the second and third persons in the identical classes of sentences examined by Delbrück, we shall find the *potential* idea, in the form of *likelihood*, *probability*, *possibility*, just as distinctly and clearly expressed as is that of desire in the first person. I claim, therefore, that we have the strongest possible reasons for believing that two distinct meanings, apparently equally primitive, were developed at a very early period, that of *desire* in the first person, and that of *possibility*, *likelihood*, in the second and third, and that subsequently these two meanings, though especially conspicuous in the particular forms in which they were respectively developed, were extended to all the persons.

We have thus far considered the development of the Latin

Subjunctive only in those clauses which remained independent throughout the classical period, but the subjunctive in many subordinate clauses also belongs to our theme, as it was developed while those clauses were yet independent. Modern linguistic research has clearly established the fact that originally the syntax of sentences in the Indo-European family of languages was exceedingly simple. Even in connected discourse, thoughts were presented separately in simple sentences, or followed each other in coördinate clauses, and yet the thoughts thus expressed were by no means equally important. In fact, one of them might be quite subordinate to another, and yet be presented as entirely coördinate with it. Homer and Plautus furnish abundant illustrations of this.

Subordinate clauses, originally unknown, were subsequently developed, by a slow and almost imperceptible change, out of simple sentences and principal clauses. Every subordinate clause therefore represents an independent sentence or clause, and accordingly in examining a subjunctive in such a clause, our first inquiry must relate to the history of the mood in this special instance. We must ascertain whether it owes its origin to the nature of the thought itself, or has been developed by the subordinate character of the clause. Upon investigation I think we shall find that in conditional sentences and in concessive, final, and consecutive clauses in Latin, the subjunctive is entirely independent of the character of the clause in which it stands, and was in fact developed before the clause became subordinate, but that in causal and temporal clauses, in dependent questions, and in the subordinate clauses of the *oratio obliqua*, the mood in many instances has been developed simultaneously with the subordinate character of the clause, and is entirely dependent upon it.

We proceed to examine the cases in which the subjunctive appears to be original, that is, to have belonged to the clause in its original and independent form. Some of these in the use of moods conform, to a considerable extent, to the corresponding constructions in Sanskrit and Greek. For this particular part of our discussion, therefore, we shall find abundant material and important aid in the work of Delbrück to which I have already referred.

We begin with conditional sentences. That the mood in the condition does not depend upon the conditional particle is obvious from the following facts :

1. The conditional particles *ei*, *si*, *nisi*, are used with different moods. In fact, in Latin *si* is used, or may be used, in every conceivable form of condition.

2. A conditional particle is not even an essential part of a conditional sentence. The force of such a sentence may be expressed in Greek, Latin, or English without any particle whatever. Thus : *Negat quis, nego*, 'does any one deny, I deny' = if any one denies, I deny. *Roges me, nihil respondeam*, 'ask me, I will make no reply.' *Lacesse ; jam videbis furentem*, 'provoke him, i. e., if you provoke him, you will see him frantic.' In these examples, it will be observed, we have the full force of conditional sentences expressed without any conditional particles, in clauses entirely independent, yet containing all possible varieties of finite moods, the indicative, subjunctive, and imperative. Moreover, in such examples as these, we find, I conceive, the original type out of which conditional sentences were developed. Originally the two clauses, the condition and the conclusion, were entirely independent, as in the examples just noticed, and the mood in each was determined by the ordinary principles which regulate the use of moods in principal clauses. The indicative was used in treating of facts, and the subjunctive or imperative in all other cases. *Si*, probably the locative case of an indefinite pronoun, meaning *at any time* or *in any manner*, has nothing whatever to do with the mood, but merely serves to show that the action in the conclusion is connected in time or manner with that in the condition. Thus, without the particle, *negat, nego*, 'he denies, I deny ;' with the particle, *si negat, nego*, literally 'he denies (at some time, then or at that time), I deny.' Here we have the indicative, whether with or without the conditional particle. Let us now analyze a case with the subjunctive : *Dies deficiat, si velim numerāre*, etc., 'let me at any time wish to recount, etc., then the day would fail me.' Here we have distinctly before us the subjunctive of desire in the condition, and the potential subjunctive in the conclusion, the identical

forms which we have met in principal clauses. The subjunctive in conditions is always a subjunctive of *desire*, that in the conclusion is generally *potential*, though that also sometimes denotes *desire*, as, *peream, si poterunt*, etc., 'they will sometime be able, etc., then let me perish.'

Concessions are so closely related to conditions that they scarcely require separate notice. The subjunctive is the same in both. Thus the subjunctive of desire is easily recognized in the following examples: *Quamvis sit magna exspectatio, tamen eam vinces*, 'let the expectation be as great as you please, even then, or even thus you will surpass it.' *Absolvite Verrem qui se fateatur pecunias cepisse*, 'acquit Verres, let him admit that he accepted money.' We must not forget that the clause introduced by *qui* was originally independent. *Licet, irrideat, plus tamen ratio valebit*, 'it is permitted, let him deride, with all this derision reason will avail more.' In this short sentence we have three clauses, each one of which retains the identical mood which it adopted when it was an independent sentence.

Again final clauses need not detain us long, as purpose necessarily involves desire, and is readily developed out of it. Such clauses therefore always contain a proposed or desired action, and accordingly in Latin require the subjunctive, as: *Punit ne peccetur*, 'he punishes, let not crime be committed.' Here the second clause contains the desire, command, purpose involved in *punit*. The independent sentence out of which it was developed already contained the subjunctive of desire, and in fact remains unchanged in form in the final clause before us. *Servis imperat ut filiam defendant*, 'he commands his servants, so let them defend his daughter.' By thus restoring the final clause to its original independent form, we can appreciate, in a measure, the true force of the subjunctive of desire. *Te rogo ut eum juves*, 'I ask you, so aid him.' *Legum idcirco servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus*, 'we are servants of the law for this reason, accordingly let us be able to be free.' *Vereor ne laborem augeam*, 'I fear, let me not increase the labor.' *Periculum est ne ille te verbis obruat*, 'there is danger, let him not overwhelm you with words.'

Moreover, in the Homeric poems, where final clauses are less fully developed than in later Greek or in Latin, we sometimes meet with passages in which it is difficult to say whether we have before us an independent clause containing the the subjunctive of desire, or a dependent clause expressing purpose. Such passages are especially instructive on the question of the origin of final clauses. Thus

μὲν οἷον ἐάσατε, . . .

. . . ἐκέσθ' ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν,

λίσσωμ' ἀνέρα τοῦτον, Iliad 22, 416,

'let me go forth alone to the ships of the Achaeans that I may supplicate this man.' But perhaps the original conception is here preserved, *let me supplicate this man*. Again, take a negative sentence,

μηδὲ τιῷ ὕπνος

αἰρείτω, μὴ χάσμα γενώμεθα δυσμενέεσσιν, Iliad 10, 192,

as purpose, *let not sleep take possession of any one, lest we become a joy to our enemies*, but perhaps better as independent clauses, *let not sleep take possession of any one, let us not become a source of joy to our enemies*.

Consecutive clauses are in origin, form, and history closely related to final clauses. Both refer to the result of the action, the former contemplating it as *probable*, as something to be *expected*, the latter as something *desired*, *intended*, *proposed*. While, therefore, the subjunctive in final clauses is found to be a subjunctive of desire, that in consecutive clauses, denoting simply expectation, is potential: *Non is sum, qui his utar*, 'I am not the one who is likely to use these things.' *Aristides ita vixit ut Atheniensibus esset carissimus*, 'Aristides so lived that he was likely to be very dear to the Athenians.' Observe that the subjunctive, in examples like this, did not originally express an actual result, but only a contemplated one, that which would follow as a matter of course. Then, in relation to a past event, the transition became very simple and natural from a contemplated result which was to be expected in a given case, and which would follow as a matter of course, to that which did follow as a matter of fact. Hence the Latin, which meant, originally, *he so lived that he would of course be very*

dear to the Athenians, may be not improperly rendered, *he so lived that he was very dear to the Athenians*.

An additional argument in support of the view that the subjunctive in consecutive clauses is potential in origin and force, is found in the fact that it takes the negative *non*, the regular negative of the potential subjunctive, while final clauses take *ne*, the regular negative for the subjunctive of desire, as: *Ita vixi, ut non frustra me natum existimem*, 'I have so lived that I do not think, or, more literally, that I am not likely to think, that I was born to no purpose.'

In the cases which we have thus far examined, the Latin Subjunctive appears to be original, that is, to have been required by the very nature of the thought contained in these clauses in their original and independent form. We find here no new use of moods, but simply the two distinct and well recognized uses of the Latin Subjunctive which run through all departments of Latin literature in all ages of its history, uses moreover not at all peculiar to the Latin, but belonging equally to the Sanskrit and the Greek.

In conclusion, it only remains for us to notice the fact that these two primitive uses of the subjunctive sometimes occur in still other classes of subordinate clauses, having been developed in them while they were still independent. As they appear, however, in forms much less disguised than those already examined, they will in general be readily recognized. A few brief examples will be a sufficient illustration of this point, as: *Etiam tum vivit, quom esse credas mortuam*, said of infamy, 'even then it lives, when you would suppose it to be dead,' the potential subjunctive in a temporal clause. *Differant, dum defervescat ira*, 'let them defer it till their anger cools, i. e., that it may cool, or to come still nearer the original conception, let them defer it, in the mean time let their anger cool.' In most other cases, as in dependent questions, and in the dependent clauses of the oratio obliqua, an original subjunctive is so easily recognized that it does not even require illustration.

We have thus endeavored to trace in outline the development of the Latin Subjunctive in Principal Clauses from its origin

in the Indo-European tongue to its latest uses in the works of Roman authors. We have seen :

1. That its forms, etymologically examined, denote *effort*, *attempted action*, and are closely related in origin and force to the conative present.

2. That attempted action suggests :

a. Desired, proposed action.

b. Probable, possible action.

3. That the uses of the subjunctive actually found in principal clauses in the works of Latin authors naturally arrange themselves in two classes, corresponding to the two meanings already derived from the etymology of the forms, and authorize us to distinguish :

a. An optative subjunctive, or a subjunctive of desire.

b. A potential subjunctive.

4. That to one or the other of these two classes belong :

a. The subjunctive in all principal clauses.

b. The subjunctive in conditional, concessive, final, and consecutive clauses.

c. All original subjunctives in other subordinate clauses.

But our discussion now brings us to a use of the Latin Subjunctive in subordinate clauses, which is peculiar and special, which finds few analogies in Sanskrit or Greek, which is not strictly potential or optative, and which seems to have few claims to be regarded as original. It occurs in causal and temporal clauses, in dependent questions, and in the subordinate clauses of the *oratio obliqua*. Unlike the uses already considered, it seems never to have been developed in principal clauses. It does not therefore fall within the scope of this paper, and the discussion of it must be reserved for a future occasion.